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The building up of the effective compensation mechanism of executives is 
an important issue, which has caught common attention in modern economics 
theory and management theory, and also a major practical problem, which is in 
urgent need of being solved in the reform of enterprises and corporate 
governance in china. In the 2005 government report, Prime minister Wen Jiabao 
also said that it was very crucial to regulate the compensation mechanism of 
executives in the state-owned-enterprises. How to compensate and inhibit the 
behavior of the executives and how to maximize the gains of shareholder are 
also the key problem in the reform of the listed company. 
What are the new characteristics of the compensation in 2003? Up to now, 
little research has been done in this field. It is why I wrote this article. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to show the present situation and reform the 
compensation mechanism of executives considering all kinds of factors. 
The specific contents of the study on the compensation mechanism of 
executives in this dissertation consist of four parts, which are as follows:   
The first part is the definition of the key word and the purpose of the 
writing 。 
The second part is a review of the relevant literature on the study of the 
compensation of executives, with the respect of management, economics and 
empirical research. We also give some remarks about these arguments. 
In the third part, using the latest data of china’s listed company in 2003, 
author summarizes and analyzes the executives’ compensation and the 
companies’ performance. The conclusions are as follows: the executives’ 
compensation is low in the whole and the difference among different company is 
becoming greater; the executives’ compensation has an industrial and regional 
effect; most of the listed company’s executives don’t have any stock; the 
relationship between the executives’ compensation and the company’s 















between the executives’ compensation and the company’s size is significantly 
positive; the number of the company workers and the identity of the company 
controller and the ratio of the circulating stock in the company also have an 
influence on the executives’ compensation. 
In the fourth part, the author gives some suggestions about how to improve 
the functioning of the executives’ incentive and constraint mechanism. The 
author designs a model in respects of government, market and companies. This 
model includes all the factors that would influence the effectiveness of incentive 
and constraint mechanism. The author thinks that the company must regard 
maximizing the shareholder’s interests as the most important goal. China 
securities regulatory commission should employ the CPA. 
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 http://finance.sina.com.cn 2003 年 07 月 16 日（经济参考报）：2001 年，年报数据表明，ＳＴ
科龙亏损 15.56 亿元，系沪深股市四家巨亏 15 亿元以上的亏损大王之一，该公司却以 高年薪 750
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① 徐建中、张德明.国企经营者经营激励探讨.企业经济.2000.4 第 21-23. 
②
 中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者价值取向：现状与特征.管理世界.2004.6，第 82－86 页。 
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